Tao of Pauly

Inside the Zarqawi Network

Editor's Note: I recently ended my two week hiatus from my poli-blog This Side of the Truth and posted this entry earlier this morning. Check it out!

Inside the Zarqawi Network is a recent article published in The Weekly Standard by terrorism expert Jon Schanzer. He discusses a how a recent memo sheds light on the top terrorist in Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi. Schanzer makes several interesting points, including the fact that the majority of funding and the main source of fighters is Iran. And lasty, Schanzer sheds light on a small border town called Qaim, a place we should all familiarize with ourselves. Here's a bit:

At least 13 Iraqis were killed in fighting with U.S. soldiers in the Iraqi city of Falluja on July 30, part of the ongoing U.S. offensive against fighters loyal to Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the man Bush administration officials claim is the most dangerous terrorist in Iraq today. Critics, however, contend that the Jordanian-born Zarqawi is a Washington-made bogeyman who is not worth the $25 million bounty on his head. They doubt the strength of Zarqawi's Tawhid and Jihad (Unity and Holy War) group, citing intelligence officials who generally agree that no more than 1,000 foreign fighters are active in Iraq.

A memo acquired by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy from Iraqi intelligence sources, however, provides a first glimpse into the configuration of Zarqawi's Iraqi network, which may be more dangerous than previously imagined. The memo, "Structure of Tawhid and Jihad Islamic Group," details several days of recent interrogations of one of Zarqawi's captured lieutenants. Umar Baziyani, Zarqawi's number four, a member of the Tawhid legislative council, and the "emir" of Baghdad, was captured by U.S. forces in late May 2004. The account of his confessions details the hierarchal structure of Zarqawi's group, its ties to Syria and Iran, the number of fighters it commands in Iraq, the names of the regional emirs, its media strategy, and more.

Schanzer continues to say that despite the lost ties from Al Qaeda after the arrest of Hassan Ghul. Here's an extremely important factor that several media groups are ignorning:

Ghul, according to U.S. officials, was carrying a message from Zarqawi to Osama bin Laden. Ghul, who was reportedly a lieutenant of 9/11 planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, was considered to be the top al Qaeda operative captured in Iraq. Baziyani explains that after Ghul's arrest, Tawhid and Jihad was cut off from al Qaeda. Recent reports, citing U.S. intelligence agencies, indicate that Zarqawi may have been trying to reconnect with bin Laden "in the last few weeks."

But that hardly affected the core structure of the group. Schanzer continued to explain that there were nine regional leaders of the Falluja-based Tawhid and Jihad under Zarqawi. And if any of them are killed or captured, a new emir steps up to take leadership. Since these emirs are spread out all over Iraq, destroying this network looks like a difficult task... especially when many of our leaders and heads of news organizations refuse to ackowledge the seriousness of this threat to stability in Iraq and to the safety of our troops. Here's some more from Schanzer:

There are also regional emirs in the Kurdish north (Hussein Salim), the western Anbar province (Abdullah Abu Azzam), and the city of Mosul (Abu Tallah). In this way, Tawhid and Jihad can execute spectacular terrorist attacks throughout the country. These include the Baghdad-based bombing of the Jordanian embassy; suicide bombings against Shiites and an attack on Basra's oil infrastructure in the south; suicide bombings against Kurds in the north; attacks against police recruiting centers throughout the country; and the beheading of American Nick Berg in an unknown location.

In addition to its regional bases, Zarqawi's group has a specially designated media department. Baziyani claims that a man named Hassan Ibrahim heads this department, along with lieutenants Khadi Hassan and "Adil," who were responsible for taping and releasing the May 11 beheading of Berg.

Schanzer also discusses the importance of Qaim a small border town. Here's more:

Tawhid and Jihad maintains a strong military presence (150 fighters) in the town of al-Qaim, which is close to the Syrian border, just west of the Euphrates River. One Pentagon official believes that the number of fighters Baziyani put in al-Qaim is likely inflated, but says that the importance of the town cannot be overstated. Al-Qaim, to the bewilderment of U.S. officials, was where the Iraqi army put up some of its fiercest resistance during the 2003 Iraq war. A senior administration official calls Qaim "critical" and "the key to understanding how Syria is involved" in the insurgency.

With the help of Zarqawi, the town is said to be a depot for weapons, cash, and fighters supplied by Zarqawi's financiers--the bulk of whom are now believed by U.S. intelligence to be operating out of Syria.

The memo shared some good news, stating that plenty of their bases have been destoryed by the US military. Schanzer's closing paragraph sums up everything.

The information in the Baziyani interrogation memo needs to be further vetted by U.S. and Iraqi intelligence. Still, the memo provides an unprecedented look into the mind of one of Zarqawi's lieutenants. It also provides a view of the small but powerful network that may or may not be at the center of the Iraqi insurgency, but has established itself as its brutal, public face.

For more related information, visit Schanzer's Garage.